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Abstract: Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) are broadly utilized in critical
infrastructures for monitoring and controlling the industrial processes remotely. The real-time
transmissions in such systems provoke security breaches. Many security breaches have been reported
impacting society severely. Hence, it is essential to achieve secure communication between the devices
for creating a secure environment. For this to be effective, the keys used for secure communication
must be protected against unauthorized disclosure, misuse, alteration or loss, which can be taken
care of by a Key Management Infrastructure. In this paper, by considering the generic industrial
automation network, a comprehensive key management infrastructure (CKMI) is designed for
IACS. To design such an infrastructure, the proposed scheme employs ECDH, matrix method,
and polynomial crypto mechanisms. The proposed design handles all the standard key management
operations, viz. key generation, device registration, key establishment, key storage, device addition,
key revocation, key update, key recovery, key archival, and key de-registration and destruction.
The design supports secure communication between the same and different levels of IACS devices.
The proposed design can be applied for major industrial automation networks to handle the key
management operations. The performance analysis and implementation results highlight the benefits
of the proposed design.
Keywords: cybersecurity; industrial automation and control systems; key management; key
pre-distribution; SCADA; SCADA security

1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures are the primary needs of the society. To reduce the complexity in the
operations of critical infrastructures, there is a need for simple and efficient process supporting remote
monitoring and control of various activities, which can be achieved through automation. Industrial
automation helps to automate the operations involved in the technical processes with much less human
intervention. Industrial automation and control systems ensure accuracy, flexibility, and reliability in
managing industrial processes. Presently, the critical infrastructures such as electric power networks,
water appropriation plants, paper and mash industry, oil refineries and fabricating plants are the major
examples in which the IACS is playing a critical role [1].
Industrial automation systems are hierarchical in structure. Different components at different
levels are used to monitor and control the industrial plants. One such IACS model is shown in Figure 1.
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The model consists of three levels: field network, control network and plant network. IACS includes
the various devices in the industrial plant to perform automation and monitor the industrial facilities.
The resource constraints at different levels of the automation system are different. The devices at
each level differ in their capacities such as storage, communication, computation, accessibility, power
requirement and latency. The various types of devices situated at different levels are as follows:
•

•

•

Field level network: It includes sensors (optical, magnetic, thermal, etc.), IEDs and actuators
(magnetic valves, motor stats, power switches, etc.). Sensors help to monitor leakages in the
pipes, to monitor pipe pressure, to monitor the flow rate, to check boilers temperature, etc. [2].
They help the IACS operator to maintain the functionality of the system in normal condition.
Hence, they are called as the eyes and ears of industrial control systems.
Control level network: It includes PLCs, RTUs, ICS servers and controllers such as AC800M,
AC800C, etc. RTUs are field level equipment used for data acquisition from sensor devices and
actuators. They are located remotely with respect to the control center. PLC functions similar to
RTU. RTUs are normally used for collecting data from a large geographical areas, whereas PLCs
are used in the case of local control.
Plant level network: It includes connectivity server, aspect server, application server, monitoring
stations, domain controller, OPC operator workplaces, third-party application servers, ICS users,
engineering and monitoring stations and other servers. The industrial network can be associated
with the web for remote observing via firewall and VPN.

For the last few years, industrial control systems security is a hot topic in the research community.
The catch of malicious activities (Stuxnet [3], Duqu, Flame, Havex [4,5], etc.) and their massive
damage on the real-time systems enforce the plant owners and the nations to consider the security for
industrial automation systems as a high priority issue [6]. The attacks occurred on SCADA systems
are discussed in [4].

Figure 1. Industrial automation and control systems.

The communications in the IACS are real-time in nature. Based on the data obtained from the
field network, the control network takes a proper decision and sends suitable commands to the
field devices to sustain the normal functioning of the industrial plant and to avoid interruption.
For example, in the case of water management systems, communications include OPEN/CLOSE the
valves; SWITCH_ON/SWITCH_OFF the device; RAISE/LOW the levels of the water tank; acquire
data such as water flow rate, water level in storage tanks, pressure in water pipes, temperature inside
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the boiler, speed of actuators; and read the characteristics such as acidity, purity, chlorine residual in
the water, etc.
The communication messages contain sensitive data; if an attacker captures or modifies the
message contents, it results in severe consequences [4,7]. The following are some of the malicious
actions that the attacker may perform:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Modify the transmitted readings
Send invalid commands or to send valid commands at a false time
Send wrong information to the control unit
Create situations leading to packet loss
Overwrite the existing programs of the remote devices
Introduce a delay in the communication
Try to block the information
Replay the data, modify the configurations of the devices, etc.

Therefore, there exists a strong requirement of communication security that protects the
communication between the devices of the industrial plant. For communication security, secret keys
are required between the communicating entities.
Due to the large size of IACS networks, involving devices with varying capabilities, managing
secret keys associated with all the communicating entities is a challenging task [8,9]. To manage the
secret keys, a good key management system is essential. Key management deals with taking the
responsibility to manage the crypto keys during their life cycle in the crypto system. It provides a
complete paradigm to handle the activities of the crypto keys, including key generation, distribution,
storage, backup, archive, recovery, revocation, and destruction [10]. Figure 2 depicts a view on general
key management states. The description of key management states are discussed in Table 1.

Figure 2. Key management states.
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Table 1. Key management states.
Key Management Operations

Purpose

Key generation

Create keys

Key distribution

Deliver the generated keys to the intended recipient.

Key establishment

Communicating parties must hold the key or parameters to generate the keys.

Key storage

Safeguard the active keys that are used for cryptographic services.

Key backup

Keep a copy of the keys.

Key update

Replace the existing keys with new keys, when the crypto
period of the key is expired or when the crypto keys are compromised.

Key recovery

Retrieve the lost keys from backup or archival storage

Key revocation

Invalidate the keys of the user/device which is compromised or when the
crypto period of key is near to expiry or when user/device leaves the network.

Key disposal

Remove the key permanently from all the sources (user, backup and archival)

Our Contribution: In this paper, by considering the generic architecture of IACS, a comprehensive
key management infrastructure is designed (Figure 8). The CKMI design enables interoperability and
flexibility for securing the industrial applications. The core contributions of the paper is discussed
as follows:
1.

2.

3.

The paper handles all the key management states in one design.
NIST Special Publication 800-57 summarizes the key management states as follows: key
generation, device registration, key establishment, key storage, device addition, key revocation,
key update, key recovery, key archival, key de-registration and destruction. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the schemes handle all key management states in one design. This motivates
us to propose a comprehensive key management scheme, which covers all the key management
states under one design.
The proposed design shall be applicable for diverse industries.
We have considered generic industrial automation networks. The network consists of three levels:
field network, control network and plant network. The bottom level is field network; middle
level is control network; and plant network is on the top of the hierarchy. Most of the industrial
network follows the same hierarchy. In this paper, key management is designed in such a way that
it can be applied for major industrial networks to secure the communications of industrial devices.
The proposed design supports secure communication between the same and different levels
of IACS devices. It supports secure communication among same level devices and also across
different level devices. The proposed design considers all the communication scenarios:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

4.

Among the field level devices
Among the control level devices
Among the plant level devices
Across field level and control level devices
Across control level and plant level devices

The proposed design does not adopt the same security mechanism for all levels of IACS.
IACS includes various devices: field level, control level and plant level devices. The resource
constraints at different levels of the automation system are different. The devices at each level differ
in their capacities such as storage, communication, computation, accessibility, power requirement and
latency. Field network devices are resource constrained devices. Hence, considering the parameters
such as low latency, low jitter and computation and communication cost is important. At the top
level of the pyramid, the devices are resource efficient when compared to field network devices.
Hence, the requirement of real time properties and parameters such as delay and jitter has relaxed
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constraints. Based on the constraints, there is a need to choose appropriate crypto algorithms. In the
proposed design, we deploy a symmetric crypto system for lower level devices (polynomial and
matrix method) and an asymmetric crypto system for higher level devices (Elliptic curve crypto
system).
Modification of configuration parameters at one level of IACS should not disturb other levels.
If the plant operator wants to configure or make changes in security parameters of the device or
identify any compromise, the disruption or changes made at one level of IACS devices should
not disturb the operations of other levels IACS devices. Since the proposed design uses different
schemes for each level, the mentioned issue can be resolved easily.
Reduce the damage caused from attacks.
The impact of attack at one layer of IACS should be minimized on rest of the network. With the
use of separate crypto system for each level of devices, the impact of any attack confines only to
that level. Thus reducing the time required for recovering from the attack and reinstalling the
fresh parameters.
Use a separate crypto system for each level of IACS devices.
Polynomial method is chosen for field level devices, matrix method for control level devices and
ECDH for plant level devices. These schemes are basically meant for establishing secret keys
between the communicating devices, but we have used the same methods to support other key
management operations such as key update, device joining, key revocation, key storage, archival,
key recovery and key de-registration and destruction.
Simplify the key update, key revocation, device addition and deletion operations.
It is observed in the literature that the key update and key revocation of a device affects the entire
system. In the proposed design, separate crypto system is employed for each level of the IACS.
Key update and key revocation for particular level devices should not disturb the entire network.
Device addition and deletion can also be easily handled.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work. Section 3
gives the preliminaries. Section 4 proposes a novel key management infrastructure for IACS. Section 5
highlights the CKMI design and its features. Section 6 is devoted to the performance evaluation of the
proposed design. Section 7 gives the conclusion of this work.
2. Related Work
Key management for an industrial plant has lots of challenges [11,12]. The security requirements
of industrial automation system and IT system are different. In [13], the authors gave an overview
of IACS and the current research trend. Dzung et al. [14] highlighted the importance of security
for IACS. In [15], NIST has provided recommendations for designing key management systems.
The recommendations specify the factors and mechanisms to be considered for designing the key
management framework. Principles of key management are discussed in [16]. Key management
problem is approached in a modular and hierarchical manner. The problems encountered due to poor
key management for IACS are discussed in [4,17]. Poor key management leads to significant issues
such as key loss or destruction, loss of sensitive data, increased complexity of security management, etc.
IEC 61850 [18] is the Open International Standard designed to solve the interoperability issues in
IACS. Its flexibility and reliability features make it popular across the globe. However, the standard
does not address security features. To handle this, IEC 62351 standard has been designed. The IEC
62351 standard [19] consists of 10 parts. Some parts are still under development. Part 9, i.e., IEC 62351-9,
is exclusively dedicated to key management profiles. The concrete key management details are not yet
given. An efficient key management solution in IEC standards exists as a challenging research area.
To solve the key management issues in automation systems, few key management solutions
are available in the literature. The schemes can be classified into centralized and decentralized
schemes. In centralized schemes [20–26], the KDC plays the role of distributing and generating the
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secret keys required for secure communication between the communicating entities. In decentralized
schemes [12,27–30], preshared keying materials are used to generate the secret keys.
A thorough survey of existing key management schemes for SCADA networks is discussed,
as shown in Table 2. To put the references in table form, we selected three parameters (BC, MC,
and RTU-RTU) and performed the comparison.
1.

2.

3.

Broadcasting (BC): In SCADA systems, there is a requirement to send the messages such as
emergency shutdown, clock information, time synchronization message, open/close all safety
valves, etc. to all the devices of the SCADA network. Hence, supporting broadcasting is essential.
Multicasting (MC): Multicasting is required to send a message only to the particular level of IACS
devices. Many examples can be quoted for the requirement of multicasting in SCADA systems.
One such example can be of sending SLEEP message to 15 devices, out of a total of 100 devices.
RTU-RTU communication (RR): Unicast communication is required for point-to-point
communication between RTU-RTU.
Table 2. Comparison of existing key management schemes for SCADA networks.
Schemes

SKE [20]

Crypto System
Symmetric (S)/
Public (P)

Centralized (C)/
Decentralized (D)

Mechanism Used

Security
Requirements
RR

Both (S) and (P)

(C)

LTK and Hash

BC

MC

X

SKMA [21]

(S)

(C)

ISO 11770-2

ASKMA [22]

(S)

(C)

LKH

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

ASKMA+ [23]

(S)

(C)

LKH and Iolus

X

BUMP IN WIRE [12]

(S)

(D)

Sec-KeyD

X

SecFB [24]

(S)

(C)

DES

X

SECURE POWER SCADA [27]

(P)

(D)

X.509 certificates

X

Versatile KMS [25]

(S)

(C)

LTK and Hash

X

Layered Defense Principle [28]

(S)

(D)

Hash chaining

X

Advanced metering
infrastructure [26]

(S)

(C)

Key graph

Smart grid [29]

(P)

(D)

Identity-Based
Cryptography

Fault tolerance KMI [31]

Both (S) and (P)

(C)

Needham–Schroeder
authentication protocol
and elliptic curve

KMI for SCADA and
WirelessHART [17,32]

(S)

(D)

Polynomial key
establishment scheme

X

X

X

KMI with Join/leave [8]

(S)

(D)

Symmetric Matrix

X

X

X

3. Preliminaries
In this section, the preliminaries used (polynomial key establishment scheme [33], matrix
method [34] and ECDH key establishment [35] ) in this paper are introduced.
3.1. Polynomial Key Establishment Scheme
Using Equation (1), KDC generates a symmetric bivariate t-degree polynomial over a finite
field F p , where p is a large prime number. Device IDs are substituted in this generated polynomial
to generate polynomial shares, i.e., f(IDi , y). The polynomial share corresponding to the device is
loaded in the device during the key distribution phase. With f (x,y), p unique polynomial shares can
be generated. Each device needs to store t + 1 coefficients of the polynomial. The scheme [33] is t-
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collision resistant, meaning that, as long as t number of devices are compromised (captured), the
communication between the non-compromised devices of the network is secure.
t

f ( x, y) =

∑

ai,j xi y j mod p

(1)

i,j=0

Two devices, e.g., X and Y, with IDs ID1 and ID2, respectively, can compute pairwise key (PK) as
follows: Both devices exchange their IDs between them. Device X computes fX (ID1, ID2). Device Y
computes fY (ID2, ID1). The symmetric property ensures fX (ID1, ID2) = fY (ID2, ID1) and, hence,
the same key is generated between them.
3.2. Matrix Key Establishment Scheme
KDC generates two matrices. One matrix is secret symmetric matrix (S) of order (λ + 1) × (λ + 1)
and other is public matrix (P) of order (λ + 1) × N, where N is the total number of devices in the
network and λ is the security parameter.
Symmetric matrix construction: Matrix S is said to be symmetric if S = S T .
Public matrix construction: KDC chooses independent key seeds S1 , S2 , . . ., S N ∈ Fp . The public
matrix P is called as Vandermonde matrix and is generated as shown in Equation (2).


S1

 ( S1 ) 2
P=
..

.

( S1 ) λ + 1

S2
( S2 ) 2
..
.
( S2 ) λ + 1

···
···
..
.
···


SN
( S N )2 


..

.

( S N ) λ +1

(2)

KDC performs matrix multiplication operation (Equation (3) for S and P matrices to obtain the
matrix A of size N × (λ + 1). Transpose operation is performed on the resultant matrix, i.e., A = (S · P) T .
A · P = (S · P)T · P = P T · S · P = ( A · P)T

(3)

Each device is loaded with a secret row of matrix A and a key seed of matrix P. Two devices
can establish the pairwise key Pij by exchanging their key seeds, followed by matrix multiplication
operation (Figure 3). The scheme is t-collision resistant, if the columns of public matrix P are linearly
independent.

Figure 3. Matrix method operation.

3.3. ECDH Key Establishment Scheme
KDC considers the elliptic curve of form y2 = x3 + ax + b over field Fp and elliptic curve domain
parameters: (p, a, b, G, n, h), where p is the prime number defining the order of the finite field. The values
of a and b ∈ p, such that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. A point G(XG , YG ) on the elliptic curve is considered as the
generator point. n is the smallest positive integer such that n · G = O (point at infinity). Cofactor
h = #E(Fp)n, where #E(Fp) is the number of points on the elliptic curve.
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Each entity has a key pair, a private key d ∈ interval [1, n − 1] and public key Q (Q = d · G),
where “·” is a scalar multiplication operation. Two devices, e.g., X and Y, with key pairs (d X , Q X )
and (dY , QY ), can compute the pairwise key (PK) as follows: Device X computes the shared secret key
PK1 = d X · QY . Device Y computes the shared secret key PK2 = dY · Q X .
4. Proposed Key Management Infrastructure Design for IACS
The proposed design aims at supporting all the common key management operations, viz. key
generation, device registration, key establishment, key storage, device addition, key revocation,
key update, key recovery, key archival, and key de-registration and destruction. The design considers
the following communication scenarios: (i) among field level devices; (ii) among control level devices;
(iii) among plant level devices; (iv) across field level and control level devices; and (v) across control
level and plant level devices. The key management phases are explained as follows:
Assumptions: CKMI server is physically protected. Each device in the network has a unique ID
and Join key. The Join keys are preloaded in the devices by the device manufacturing unit during the
device manufacturing phase. The CKMI server has the Join keys of all the devices. It is assumed that
trust is employed between the device manufacturing plant and industrial plant.
4.1. Key Generation
•

Field level devices: Along with polynomial key establishment parameters (polynomial shares),
128-bit random key is generated for field level devices. The generated key is used as a field level
group key (FGK) for field network devices.
Control level devices: Along with matrix method key establishment parameters (secret rows ∈
matrix A and key seeds ∈ matrix P), 128-bit random key is generated for control level devices.
The generated key is used as a control level group key (CGK) for control network devices.
Plant level devices: Along with ECDH method key establishment parameters (public and private
key pairs), 128-bit random key is generated for plant level devices. The generated key is used as a
plant level group key (PGK) for plant network devices.

•

•

Algorithm 1 depicts the key generation process for IACS devices.
Algorithm 1 Key generation for IACS devices.
CKMI server: Generates the security parameters for various crypto methods to be used.
2: if Key generation is for field level devices then
1:

Choose Polynomial method for key establishment
Generate λ-degree polynomial equation (P)
5:
Evaluate polynomial shares by substituting unique IDs in P
6:
Generate 128-bit field level group key (FGK)
7: else if Key generation is for control level devices then
3:
4:

8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

Choose matrix method for key establishment
Generate secret symmetric matrix S and public matrix P
Perform matrix multiplication A = SXP and transpose to get A T
Generate 128-bit control level group key (CGK)
else if Key generation is for plant level devices then
Choose ECDH method for key establishment
Generate elliptic curve domain parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h)
Generate private keys di ∈n and public keys Qi = di ·G
Generate 128-bit plant level group key (PGK)
end if

Future Internet 2019, 11, 126

9 of 25

4.2. Device Registration/Device Join Phase
When a device is connected to the CKMI server for initial bootstrapping, the CKMI server sends a
request for the device to send the resource configuration details. The device sends the unique device
ID and the resource configuration details (the type of device and resource footprint (battery power,
memory, and processing capacity)). The resource configuration details are encrypted using the Join key.
The CKMI server authenticates the device by decrypting the received message using the Join key of
the corresponding device. Based on the resource configuration details, appropriate crypto mechanisms
will be loaded into the device.
•

Field level devices: If the device belongs to field level category, polynomial method key
establishment parameters, i.e., a polynomial share from the polynomial pool and a corresponding
ID used for generating the polynomial share, are sent to the device. The keying materials are
encrypted using the Join key. The FGK is loaded in all authenticated field devices for securing the
broadcast messages to be sent by the CKMI server to all field level devices.
Control level devices: The rows of matrix A are used as the key material for the devices to
generate the secret key. Thus, each device will get a secret row from the secret matrix A and the
corresponding column seed value from the public matrix P. The keying materials are encrypted
using the Join key and sent to the control devices. The CGK is loaded in all authenticated control
devices for securing the broadcast messages to be sent by the CKMI server to all control level
devices. Public matrix (P) is made available in the public key directory.
Plant level devices: If the device belongs to the plant level category, it will load the elliptic curve
domain parameters and a random number di (private key of the device). The keying materials are
encrypted using the Join key and sent to the plant devices. The PGK is loaded in all authenticated
plant level devices for securing the broadcast messages to be sent by the CKMI server to all plant
level devices. The elliptic curve parameters and public keys of the devices are made available in
the public key directory.

•

•

Algorithm 2 depicts the Device registration/Device join process for IACS devices.
Algorithm 2 Device registration and Key distribution for IACS devices.
Request f or con f iguration details

1:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ IACS device

2:

IACS device −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CKMI server

3:

if Device ∈ field level category then

DeviceID ||{Con f iguration details} E

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

Joinkey

{ polynomial method keying materials|| FGK } E Joinkey

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Field level device
else if Device ∈ control level category then
{matrix method keying materials||CGK } E Joinkey

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Control level device
else if Device ∈ plant level category then
{ ECDH method keying materials|| PGK } E Joinkey

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Plant level device
end if
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4.3. Key Establishment Phase
•

Field level devices: Any pair of field devices establish secure communication between themselves
using their preshared polynomial shares. Sinceb devices have the polynomial shares of the same
polynomial equation, they can get the same shared secret key (Section 3.1). A nonce is used to
prevent the replay attack.
Control level devices: Any pair of control devices establish secure communication between
themselves using their preshared secret row and a seed value. Equation (3) and Figure 3 confirm
that the same shared secret key is generated between any two control level devices (Section 3.2).
A nonce is used to prevent the replay attack.
Plant level devices: Any pair of plant devices establish secure communication between them using
their preshared elliptic curve parameters. The same key is generated on both devices (Section 3.3),
e.g., PD1 and PD2, because PK1 = K1 × P2 = K1 × (K2 · G) = (K2 × KD) × G = K2 × P1 = K2
× (K1 · G) = K2 × P1 = PK2, where PK1 and PK2 are the shared secret key generated between
the devices, K1 and K2 are the private keys and P1 and P2 are the public keys of the devices
respectively. Nonce is used to prevent the replay attack.

•

•

Algorithm 3 depicts the key establishment process for IACS devices. In Algorithm 3, PK is the
pair-wise key and SK is the session key generated between the devices.
Algorithm 3 Key establishment between IACS devices.
1:

if Communication is between Field device (FD1) → Field device (FD2) then
ID1

2:

FD1 −−→ FD2

3:

FD2: Computes PK and generates nonce

4:

FD2 −−−−−−−−→ FD1

5:

FD1: Computes PK and SK (nonce × PK)

6:

FD1 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ FD2

7:

FD2: Computes SK and checks for integrity of received data

8:
9:

ID2||{nonce} PK

{ Data}SK || Hash( Data)

else if Communication is between Control device (CD1) → Control device (CD2) then
Seed S1

CD1 −−−−→ CD2

10:

CD2: Computes PK and generates nonce

11:

CD2 −−−−−−−−−−→ CD1

12:

CD1: Computes PK and SK (nonce × PK)

13:

CD1 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ CD2

14:

CD2: Computes SK and checks for integrity of received data

15:

Seed S2||{nonce} PK

{ Data}SK || Hash( Data)

else if Communication is between Plant device (PD1) → Plant device (PD2) then
Public key PD1

16:

PD1 −−−−−−−−→ PD2

17:

PD2: Computes PK and generates nonce

18:

PD2 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ PD1

19:

PD1: Computes PK and SK (nonce × PK)

20:

PD1 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ PD2

21:

PD2: Computes SK and checks for integrity of received data

22:

public key PD2||{nonce} PK

{ Data}SK || Hash( Data)

end if
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4.4. Key Storage
CKMI server maintains all the active keys used for secure communication at field, control and
plant level networks. It maintains a database containing the attributes key store reference, network ID,
Device ID, key generation date, and key expiry date. The key store database contains the cryptographic
keying materials of key establishment parameters of the devices (Figure 4). The records in the key store
are encrypted using a password known by the crypto officer. A redundant copy of the database and
key store are maintained (backup) by the CKMI server to recover the parameters if keying materials
are lost.
•
•
•

Field level devices: Key store contains Join key, device polynomial shares, polynomial equation
and FGK used for field level network devices.
Control level devices: Key store contains Join key, device secret rows, seed values and CGK used
for control level network devices.
Plant level devices: Key store contains Join key, elliptic curve parameters, private and public keys
of the devices and PGK used for plant level network devices.

Figure 4. Key storage.

4.5. Device Addition
When a new authenticated device is required to be added to the network, it goes through the device
registration phase (Section 4.2). Algorithm 4 depicts the device addition process for IACS devices.
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Algorithm 4 Device addition.
1:

if New Field Device is added to the field level network then

2:

CKMI server:

3:

Considers one polynomial share (PS) ∈ polynomial pool, ID used for generating PS and FGK.

4:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−→ New Field Device.

5:

CKMI server broadcasts message to all field level devices about the addition of new device

{ PS|| ID || FGK } E Joinkey

(encrypted using FGK).
6:

else if New Control Device is added to the control level network then

7:

CKMI server:

8:

One extra column is added to the public matrix using a seed value (SD).

9:

Performs matrix multiplication A = Symmetric matrix (S) × public matrix (P) and transpose A T .
Considers the newly generated row (ER) in A T and CGK.
{ ER||SD ||CGK } E Joinkey

10:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−→ New Control Device.

11:

CKMI server broadcasts message to all control level devices about the addition of new device
(encrypted using CGK) and also updates the public matrix in the public key directory.

12:

else if New Plant Device is added to the plant level network then

13:

CKMI server:

14:

Considers Elliptic curve domain parameters (EDP), a private key (D) and PGK.

15:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−→ New Plant Device.

16:

CKMI server broadcasts message to all plant level devices about the addition of new device

{ EDP|| D || PGK } E Joinkey

(encrypted using CGK) and also adds the public key of the new device in the public key directory.
17:

•

•

end if
Field level devices: CKMI server installs one of the available polynomial shares using a
combination of a polynomial from the polynomial pool, a polynomial share generation ID and a
Field level group key.
CKMI server broadcasts a message to all field level devices (encrypted using FGK) about the
addition of a new device. Once the new device is deployed in the field level network, it can
securely communicate with other field devices using the polynomial share received from the
CKMI server.
Control level devices: Control level devices will get stored with a secret row from matrix A and a
seed value from public matrix P. In the case when no rows are available in matrix A, there is a
need for generating additional rows in matrix A, which can be done as follows:
–
–

CKMI server adds one extra column to the matrix P by considering a new seed value.
No modification is required in the matrix S.
To generate a new secret row in matrix A, the CKMI server performs the matrix multiplication
operation for P and S matrices. Transpose operation A = (S · P) T is performed. This results
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in one extra row in matrix A, as shown in Figure 5. This extra row can be considered as the
secret row for the new device.
•

Plant level devices: The CKMI server installs the elliptic curve domain parameters, a unique
private key ∈ Fp and plant level group key for the new device.
The CKMI server broadcasts a message to all plant level devices (encrypted using PGK) informing
about the addition of a new device and also adds the public key of the new device to a public key
directory. Once the new device is deployed in the plant level network, it can securely communicate
with other plant devices using the elliptic curve parameters and the public and private keys
received from the CKMI server.

Figure 5. Device addition operation.

4.6. Key Revocation
Once the CKMI server identifies that a device is compromised or needs to be removed for some
reason, its association with the industrial network should be eliminated. Algorithm 5 depicts the key
revocation process for IACS devices.
•

Field level devices: CKMI server broadcasts a message containing the ID of the evicted device.
The message is encrypted using FGK. After receiving such a message, the field devices update
their device ID revocation list. It is assumed that each field device maintains a separate device ID
revocation list.
For every communication, devices check the ID of the device in the device ID revocation list.
If the communication requesting device’s ID is present in that list, the device terminates the
connection and informs the same to the CKMI server.

•

Control level devices: CKMI server broadcasts a message containing the seed value of the evicted
device. The message is encrypted using CGK. After receiving such a message, the control level
devices update their seed value revocation list. It is assumed that each control level device
maintains a seed revocation list. In addition, the CKMI server updates the public matrix in the
public key directory by removing the column of the compromised device.
For every communication, devices check the seed value of the device in the seed revocation
list. If the communication requesting device’s seed value is present in the seed revocation list,
the device terminates the connection and informs the same to the CKMI server.

•

Plant level devices: To achieve key revocation, the CKMI server broadcasts a message containing
the public key of the evicted device. The message is encrypted using PGK. After receiving such a
message, the plant level devices update their public key revocation list. It is assumed that each
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plant level device maintains a public key revocation list. In addition, the CKMI server removes
the public key of the compromised device from the public key directory.
For every communication, devices check the public key of the device in the revocation list.
If the communication requesting device’s public key is present in the revocation list, the device
terminates the connection and informs the same to the CKMI server.
Algorithm 5 Key revocation.
1:

if Key revocation is for Field device then
{ Evicted deviceID } EFGK

2:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Field devices

3:

Field Devices: Updates Device ID revocation list.

4:

else if Key revocation is for Control device then
{ Evicted device seed value} ECGK

5:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Control devices

6:

Control Devices: Updates Seed value revocation list.

7:

CKMI server: Updates the public matrix in public key directory by removing the column of the
compromised device.

8:

else if Key revocation is for Plant device then
{ Evicted device public key} EPGK

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Plant devices

9:

Plant Devices: Updates public key revocation list.
CKMI server: Removes the public key of the compromised device from the public key directory.

10:
11:
12:

end if

4.7. Key Update
According to the security policies and requirements, the keying materials of the devices should
be updated. The old parameters of the device are archived, and CKMI server is involved in updating
new parameters for the devices. Algorithm 6 depicts the key update process for IACS devices.
•

•

Field level devices: If the CKMI server wants to update the keying materials of a specific device,
Join key of the device is used to send the new polynomial share and the ID used for generating
the polynomial share.
If the CKMI server wants to modify all the security parameters of the device, it uses a commissioning
device [36]. The commissioning device is a portable device used by the commissioning engineer
to configure the security parameters of the devices in the industrial plant. For field level devices,
the new parameters include new polynomial share with a new ID, Join key and FGK.
Control level devices:
–

–

If CKMI server needs to update the keying materials (secret row and seed value) of the specific
control device, it changes the seed value of the corresponding device in the public matrix and
performs matrix multiplication for secret symmetric matrix (S) and the updated public matrix
(P). The matrix multiplication operation results in a change of only one secret row corresponding
to the device, which requires a key update and remaining rows are not affected in the matrix A.
The Join key of the device is used to send the new secret row and the seed value for the device.
The CKMI server updates the public matrix in the public key directory.
If CKMI server wants to modify all the security parameters of the device, it uses commissioning
device. For control level devices, the new parameters include a new secret row from matrix A,
a seed value from the new public matrix P, Join key and CGK.
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Plant level devices:
If CKMI server needs to update the private key of the specific device, it considers a new private
key di (where di ranges from 1 to n-1). The new private key is encrypted using the Join key and
sent to the device. The public key of the device is updated in the public key directory.
If CKMI server needs to modify all the security parameters of the device, it uses
commissioning device. For plant level devices, the new parameters include elliptic curve
domain parameters, new private key, join key and PGK.

–

–

Algorithm 6 Key update.
1:
2:
3:

if Key update is for Field devices then
{new polynomial share|| ID } E Joinkey

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Field device
else if Key update is for Control devices then

4:

CKMI server:

5:

Updates the seed value of the corresponding device in the public matrix
Performs matrix multiplication A = Symmetric matrix (S) × public matrix (P) and take transpose

6:

AT

{new secret row||seed value} E Joinkey

7:

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Control device

8:

CKMI server: Updates the public matrix in public key directory

9:
10:
11:
12:

else if Key update is for Plant devices then
{new private key|| public key} E Joinkey

CKMI server −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Plant device
CKMI server: Public key of the device is updated in public key directory
end if

4.8. Archival
Archival refers to off-line long-term storage of post-operational keys. The keying material that is
no longer in regular use is archived. The cases where archiving can be needed includes instances of
crypto period expiry and cases when the key material of a device is compromised.
•
•
•

The archived contents for the field level devices include polynomial shares and the ID used,
polynomial equation, Join key and FGK.
Control level devices: The archived contents for the control level devices include a public matrix
(seed values), secret symmetric matrix (secret rows), Join key and CGK.
Plant level devices: The archived contents for the plant level devices include parameters of elliptic
curves, the private key and Join key of the device and the PGK.

4.9. Key Recovery
If the session key is lost due to device failure or crash in communication, the IACS devices
themselves regenerate the pair-wise key by repeating the operations, as discussed in key establishment
phase (Section 4.3). Algorithm 7 depicts the key recovery process for IACS devices.
•
•
•

Field level devices: The session key is regenerated using the polynomial shares followed by the
operations, as discussed in the key establishment phase.
Control level devices: The session key is regenerated using the secret row and seed value followed
by matrix multiplication operations, as discussed in the key establishment phase.
Plant level devices: The session key is regenerated using the private key and public key followed
by scalar multiplication operations, as discussed in the key establishment phase.
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In the case that all security parameters of the device are destroyed, key recovery is made by CKMI
server by reinstalling the parameters using the commissioning device.
Algorithm 7 Key recovery.
1:

if Pair-wise key is lost between field devices then
Devices regenerate it by exchanging IDs and substitute it in their polynomial shares.

2:
3:

else if Pair-wise key is lost between control devices then
Devices regenerate it by exchanging seed values and by performing matrix multiplication

4:

operation.
5:

else if Pair-wise key is lost between plant devices then
Devices regenerate it by exchanging public keys and by performing scalar multiplication

6:

operation.
7:

else if All the security parameters of the device are lost then
Key recovery is done by CKMI server using the commissioning device

8:
9:

end if

4.10. Key de-Registration and destruction
CKMI server removes all the traces of keying materials from local storage, backup and archive
when the usage of keying materials is no longer required. In the case of field level devices, the keying
materials are polynomial key establishment parameters. In the case of control level devices, the keying
materials are matrix key establishment parameters. In the case of plant-level devices, the keying
materials are ECDH key establishment parameters.
4.11. Across Field Level and Control Level Devices
Along with supporting secure communications between the same level devices, the proposed
scheme handles secure communications between different level devices. For secure communication
between the control and field level devices, our design uses a polynomial method.
•

Workflow
During the device registration phase (Section 4.2), along with storing the keying materials
of matrix method, polynomial method parameters (a polynomial share and the ID used for
generating the polynomial share) are also stored in the control level devices.
The control device uses matrix method parameters to communicate devices belonging to the
same level network. The control device uses polynomial method parameters to communicate
with field level network devices. The key establishment process follows the same procedure as
portrayed in the field-level device key establishment process (Section 4.3).

•

Observations
–

Let us consider the scenario shown in Figure 6. The control level devices are represented
by CD1, CD2, . . . CDn. The field level devices are represented by FD1, FD2, . . ., FDn. The
devices CD1, FD1, . . ., FDi are considered as Group 1. The devices CD3, FDi+1, . . ., FDn are
represented as Group 2.
In this scenario, the field devices FD1, FD2, . . . FDi need to communicate only with the control
device CD1. The field devices FDi+1, FDi+2, . . . FDn need to communicate only with the
control device CD3, i.e., intergroup communication is not allowed. Hence, the CKMI server

Future Internet 2019, 11, 126

–

–

–

17 of 25

can use different polynomial equations for Group 1 and Group 2. In the key distribution
phase, along with storing matrix method parameters, the device CD1 is also stored with
one polynomial share of the polynomial equation, which is considered for Group 1 devices.
Using the polynomial share, the device CD1 can communicate with field devices (FD1, FD2,
. . . FDi) and vice versa. Similarly, CD3 is also stored with one polynomial share of the
polynomial equation, which is considered for Group 2 devices. Using the polynomial share,
the device CD3 can communicate with field devices (FDi+1, FDi+2, . . . FDn) and vice versa.
If similar applications are running in the industrial plant, the CKMI server can use the shares
of the same polynomial equation for different groups. It enables communication between
different groups of devices under different control level devices.
If applications are different between the groups, it is better to use polynomial shares of
different polynomials for each group of devices. This avoids the communication between
different group devices, which are running different applications.
Use of different polynomial equations for each group also reduces the impact of a network
compromise. This is because, if any device is compromised, the impact will be on the
compromised group. Other groups are safe and, hence, can continue their operations.

Figure 6. Secure Communication between field and control level devices.

4.12. Across Control Level and Plant Level Devices
The matrix method is used to support secure communication between the control level and plant
level devices.
•

Workflow
During the device registration phase, along with storing the keying materials of ECDH method
(Section 4.2), matrix method parameters (a secret row and a seed value) are also stored in the
plant level devices.
The plant device uses ECDH method parameters to communicate with devices belonging
to the same level network. The plant device uses matrix method parameters and vice versa
to communicate with control level network devices. The key establishment process follows
the same procedure as described in the control level device key establishment process (Section 4.3).

•

Observations
–

Typically, the higher level devices of the automation networks have more relaxed constraints
in terms of storage, communication and computation capacity, processing speed, etc. as
compared to the lower level devices. Therefore, plant-level devices are responsible for
initiating communication between plant level and control level devices.
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Use of symmetric method (matrix method) between Plant and Control level devices involves
less computation and communication cost. To handle multiple applications and to reduce
the impact of network compromise, the grouping of devices can be done, as discussed in
Section 4.11 (Figure 6).

5. CKMI Design and Its Features
Figure 7 depicts our overall design of the CKMI. It has plant level network (PN), control level
network (CN) and field level network (FN) and all the key management operations. The proposed
CKMI design features are summarized as follows:
•

•
•

•

•

Handles all common key management operations: The CKMI server plays a key role in all
key management operations such as Key generation (Algorithm 1), Device registration/Device
joining (Algorithm 2), Key establishment (Algorithm 3), Key update (Algorithm 6), Key recovery
(Algorithm 7), Device addition (Algorithm 4), Key revocation (Algorithm 5), Key storage,
Key archival and Key de-registration and destruction.
The proposed design handles secure communication between the same and different levels of
IACS devices.
The higher is the level of the network in the hierarchy in IACS (from a field to plant network),
the more the constraints are relaxed for the devices in terms of latency, computation and
communication overhead, storage, etc. According to the constraints, the appropriate crypto
mechanism is considered for each layer of IACS.
Based on the resource configuration details of the devices, a suitable crypto mechanism is
employed for the devices. A symmetric crypto system is employed for field and control level
devices. An asymmetric crypto system is employed for plant level devices.
Our design follows a centralized key management aspect. It offers the following benefits:
–
–
–
–

•

•
•

•
•

Only communications between devices authenticated by the CKMI server will occur in the
network. For any device to communicate with another device, they must participate in the secret
key generation. With suitable pre-shared parameters and message exchanges, the same secret key
is generated on both the devices.
The secret key is never transmitted over the network during the key establishment phase.
Thus, the chances of exposure of secret keys are reduced.
The hierarchical industrial architecture and separate crypto systems for each level of devices avoid
the disruption of service due to key management in the case of device failures. In other words,
device failures will not affect the comprehensive key management infrastructure operations,
although the communication with that device is lost.
The proposed scheme minimizes the number of communications for setting up the keys, which is
generally one of the most resource consuming operations in these types of networks.
Scalability is efficiently achieved at all levels of IACS.
–
–

•

It provides a place to define unified security policies.
It provides a higher degree control of crypto keys and hence provides operational efficiency.
It provides transparency in auditing, storage and backup processes with clear separation
of tasks.
A single point of failure of CKMI server can be handled with a secondary CKMI server.

Device addition is supported. This will not disturb the existing communications, and no
modification is required in the existing devices.
Device deletion, i.e., key revocation is handled to stop the communication between the
deleted device and the existing devices.

Replay attack is eliminated using nonces during key establishment.
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Figure 7. Proposed CKMI design for IACS.

6. Performance Analysis
6.1. Justification of Key Establishment Mechanisms Employed for Establishing the Shared Secret Keys
Based on the constraints of IACS devices, the proposed design makes use of the polynomial
method, matrix method and ECDH method to establish the shared secret keys between the devices.
The selected key establishment mechanisms are well supported to handle all the key management
operations effectively.
•

Justification for choosing Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman key establishment scheme
–

Fewer bits: The security level of a 160-bit ECC, 1024-bit RSA, and 1024-bit DSA is similar. ECC
requires fewer bits. Table 3 shows a comparison between ECC and other crypto techniques.
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Table 3. Comparing the key size in terms of computation effort [37].

–

Symmetric Key Size (bits)

ECC-Based Scheme (bits)

RSA/DSA (bits)

56
80
112
128
192
256

112
160
224
256
384
512

512
1024
2048
3072
7680
15,360

Power consumption: ECC crypto mechanism consumes less power for its functioning when
compared to other asymmetric crypto schemes (Table 4).
Table 4. Analyzing the energy consumption of security protocols [38].

–

–

Algorithm

Key Size (bits)

Key Generation (µs)

Sign (mJ)

Verify (mJ)

RSA
DSA
ECDSA

1024
1024
163

270.13
293.20
226.65

546.5
313.6
134.2

15.97
338.02
196.23

Computational efficiency Use of scalar multiplication enables fast computation. ECC based
scheme has a wide selection of finite fields and curves. As per crypto++ 5.6.0 benchmarks [39],
the run time of ECDH key-pair generation over GF(p) 256 is 0.00287 s and the run time of
ECDH key agreement over GF(p) 256 is 0.00282 s.
Discrete logarithmic problem: ECDH works on the discrete logarithm problem. It is hard
to crack the private keys of the devices.

Over the past few years, elliptic curve cryptography has gained popularity and has become a
standard around the world. In IACS hierarchy, when compared to control and field level devices,
the plant level devices have sufficient storage and computational capabilities. From the above
analysis, it can be observed that the ECDH approach is more suitable than any other public key
schemes for key establishment in plant level devices.
•

Justification for choosing the matrix method and polynomial method key establishment schemes.
–
–

–

–
–

Connectivity: Any pair of devices of the same level in IACS can communicate directly.
High resilience: Both polynomial and matrix-based system are λ collision resistance
methods, meaning that, as long as λ number of devices are compromised, the communication
between the non-compromised devices is secure.
Less communication overhead: The number of messages exchanged to compute the shared
secret key is less. In the polynomial method, the device ID is exchanged. In the matrix
method, a seed value is exchanged.
Scalable: Both methods are scalable.
Less storage overhead: In the case of a polynomial method, field devices are required to
store only one λ-degree polynomial share. Based on the degree of the polynomial, it utilizes
memory and provides security. In the case of a matrix method, control devices are required
to store only one secret row and a seed value. By choosing the appropriate value for λ,
both storage and computation overhead can be optimized.

The novelty of our work resides in the fact that originally, the basic polynomial method, matrix
method and ECDH method handled only key establishment, but our proposed scheme handles
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device addition, key storage, key revocation, key update, and key recovery in addition to the
original behavior.
6.2. Security Analysis and Comparison
The key establishment schemes used in the proposed design is resilient in nature. The secure
property of the schemes depend on the parameters shown in Table 5. Table 6 gives the comparison
between the key management designs.
Table 5. Secure property of the key establishment schemes.
Key Establishment Schemes

Secure Property of the Schemes

Polynomial Key establishment scheme
Matrix Key establishment scheme
ECDH

λ collision resistance property
λ collision resistance property
Discrete logarithmic problem

Table 6. Comparison between the previous works and proposed work in terms of key management
states supported.
Key Management States Supported
Schemes
SKE [20]
SKMA [21]
ASKMA+ [23]
Versatile KMS [25]
Advanced metering infrastructure [26]
KMI with Join/leave [8]
Proposed Scheme

S1

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

S2

S3

S4

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

S5

X
X
X
X
X

S6

X
X
X
X

S7

S8

S9

S10

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

Note: S, State; S1, Key Generation; S2, Device Registration; S3, Key Establishment; S4, Key Storage; S5,
Device Addition; S6, Key Revocation; S7, Key Update; S8, Key Recovery; S9, Key Archival; S10, Key Destruction.

The design is resistant to the following attacks:
•
•

•

Replay attack: In the proposed scheme, this attack is eliminated using nonce values during key
establishment.
Key exposure attack: In the proposed scheme, the secret key is never transmitted over the
network during the key establishment phase. Alternatively, devices self-compute the keys using
the pre-shared crypto parameters. Thus, the chances of exposure of secret keys are reduced.
Man in middle attack: If the adversary is able to capture all the communication data between the
devices, he will not be able to either compromise the devices or compute the secret key used for
encrypting the messages. Use of digital signatures for ECDH prevents man-in-the-middle attack.

6.3. Test Setup and Implementation Results
The prototype was developed and tested for the proposed key management infrastructure for
IACS. Figure 8 shows the setup of an industrial automation network with key establishment schemes.
The bottom level is the field level, the middle level is the control level, and the plant level is at the
top. The communication medium was Ethernet with IP based network. Each device had a unique IP
address. It was assumed that the key server had loaded the crypto parameters of the key establishment
schemes in the devices using a secure channel.
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Figure 8. Test setup of industrial automation network with key establishment schemes.

The applications were written in C and compiled using gcc on Windows 32 bits machine.
Tables 6–12 show the various computation results for the schemes proposed in CKMI.
Table 7. Polynomial shares generation time.
Degree of the Polynomial

Number of Shares (Mod Value)

Computation Time (in µs)

10
20
50
100

1009
1009
1009
1009

968
2750
8269
17,705

Table 8. Computation time to generate the session key in polynomial method.
Degree of the Polynomial

Time Required to Generate Session Key
(Addition and Multiplication Operations) (in µs)

5
15
25
50
100

0.5
2.5
4.5
9.6
20
Table 9. Time required to perform transpose operation.
Order of the Matrix

Computation Time (in µs)

5×5
10 × 10
15 × 15

1
4
7

Table 10. Computation time to generate the session key in matrix method.
Order of the Matrix

Computation Time (in µs)

10 × 10
25 × 25
50 × 50
100 × 100

1.46
4.59
9.88
25.21
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Table 11. Elliptic curve point generation for the curve y2 = x3 + x + 1 (where a = 1, b = 1).
Finite Field (Fp )

Number of Points on the Curve (Cardinality)

Computation Time (in µs)

F5
F509
F2113
F4021

9
520
2173
4012

1.36
10,000
210,000
740,000

Table 12. Scalar multiplication operation in ECDH method.
Scalar Value

Point

Computation Time (in µs)

100
500
1000

(0,4,1)
(0,4,1)
(0,4,1)

0.54
0.82
0.89

7. Conclusions
We have proposed an elegant key management design for IACS to handle the key management
operations. The design considers all the key management operations by considering the constraints of
IACS devices. The proposed design can be applied for major IACS by using suitable crypto methods
such as ECDH, matrix and polynomial method. The choice of these schemes is justified. Although
these crypto methods are meant for key establishment, the same methods are extended to support other
key management operations. Changes made at one level of devices to incorporate key management
operations does not affect the other level of devices. The impact of attack confines only to that level of
devices, thus reducing the recovery time of devices. The test setup and implementation results show
that the design is efficient. The proposed design is scalable and supports to secure the communications
of IACS devices.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
ASKMA
BC
CGK
CKMI
CN
ECC
ECDH
FGK
FN
HMI
IACS
ICS
IEC
KMI
KDC
MC
NIST
OPC
PK

Advanced SCADA Key Management Architecture
Broadcasting
Control Level Group Key
Comprehensive Key Management Infrastructure
Control Level Network
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Die Hellman
Field Level Group Key
Field Level Network
Human Machine Interface
Industrial Automation and Control Systems
Industrial Control Systems
Intelligent Electronic Device
Key Management Infrastructure
Key Distribution Center
Multicasting
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Open Platform Controller
Pairwise Key
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PN
PGK
PLC
RR
RTU
SCADA
SK
VPN
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Plant Level Network
Plant Level Group Key
Programmable Logic Controller
RTU-RTU
Remote Terminal Units
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Session Key
Virtual Private Networks
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